Introduction
This article explores some of the possibilities in a pragmatic approach to proof testing of process plant protection systems. It is preferable that a proof test should reflect real operating conditions; in this respect, the ideal approach is to drive the process variable to a point where it triggers the safety system action, but without placing a real demand on the protection, i.e., with no risk of a hazard should the protection fail. This is all very well, but the notion of 100% coverage, end-to-end testing is usually difficult or impossible to implement on a practical basis on real plant.
The following observations on approaches to testing are by no means exhaustive, but hopefully will highlight the considerations that will allow users to identify the specific requirements for their own installation. Recognition of these same considerations should also allow effective design of the installation to facilitate testing.
Underpinning Philosophy
It should be recognised that the indiscriminate pursuit of the testing 'ideal' may actually degrade safety -it may compromise system integrity and/or divert resources which might well be better employed in securing a more significant safety return elsewhere. The law of diminishing returns (inevitably) applies. It should be remembered that there are no absolute guarantees of safety -the moment you walk away from your proof test there is a possibility and associated probability that the system has suffered a dangerous failure. Our concern is with the prudent and responsible management of risk, NOT its elimination (which is impossible). With testing as with other safety system concerns, the higher the SIL, the greater the degree of rigour required.
One of the first points of possible confusion is the objective of your testing. The purpose of proof testing is to drive the probability of failure on demand (pfd) due to random hardware failures, to a sufficiently low level, consistent with the nominated SIL. Its purpose is NOT to validate the design. (Design validation is an earlier part of the lifecycle). The ongoing integrity of the design should be maintained by appropriate management of change provisions. At some point, testing to re-validate the design may be appropriate, but this is not the purpose of routine periodic proof testing.
There may well be a trade off between coverage factor and disturbance. Any disturbance to an installation for testing purposes may in fact inadvertently compromise the protection function. The risk associated with installation disturbance may mean that a marginal increase in coverage is not warranted.
If a partial proof test is implemented more frequently in recognition of the partial coverage, the requirement to perform a full test to provide 100% coverage can be at extended intervals. If, in order to achieve the required probability of failure on demand, a proof test is required with 100% coverage at period x, a partial test at twice that period i.e., 2x, would mean a full 100% (Maintenance Interval) check at periods identified in the table below as a function of the coverage factor, if the same pfd is to be maintained.
So if a proof test with 100% coverage would be required every year, the same PFD could be achieved with a partial test at 90% coverage every 6 months, and a full maintenance test every 11 x 0.5 = 5.5 years.
If we take:
For a proof test interval T, failure rate λ, with 100% coverage.
With partial coverage C and Maintenance Test Interval T M Now, with T M = nT, and seeking equivalence in PFD between 100% coverage at interval T, and partial coverage C at more frequent intervals T/m, and remaining coverage at interval T M : The table is constructed for m = 2, giving n= 5.5 if coverage is 90%. So with partial proof test interval at half of 100% coverage interval, the required 'maintenance' interval would be at 5.5 x 2 = 11 times the partial test interval.
It may be appropriate to capture information from real trip events. This may enhance coverage or avoid the need to perform a difficult proof test. Critical examination of historical trends may provide evidence, but care is needed to avoid misinterpretation, did a flow stop because; the control valve closed, the pump stopped, the ESD valve closed or some combination of these? Did a control valve close because of a command from the DCS or operation of an ESD solenoid valve? If an effect has multiple possible causes, it may be difficult to confirm the operation of a particular cause. Cascading trips as a plant shuts down may invoke the operation of effects from causes other than the one of interest. The possible ambiguities generally make reliance on feedback from operations personnel an unsatisfactory approach. An unequivocal determination is required; the basis and required records should be identified as part of a formal, documented method. This approach is only likely to be useful in exceptional circumstances.
Test Method Principles
Disturbance to the installation should be minimised to reduce potential for inadvertent introduction of failures. Therefore testing should be non-invasive as far as practicable; e.g., circuit checks for presence/absence of voltage or continuity are preferred, where no disturbance to circuit wiring is required. Such tests should be cycled through presence/absence to prove correct circuit addressing.
Any disturbance should be failsafe wherever practicable e.g. a failsafe circuit may be isolated from supply by wire disconnection or opening of a terminal knife. Overrides should be avoided as far as practicable -brief energising of circuits to perform cycle tests may be via a flying lead with a connection maintained by hand application, rather than by modification to the circuit installation. The wholesale application of overrides to force a system to a healthy condition should be avoided.
If override jumpers are used for any reason, they should be highly conspicuous (e.g. minimum wire length of 1m) so that there is minimal risk of them being inadvertently left in place. Their application should be recorded in a register. (Count them all in, count them all out).
One of the key points is that if an element is demonstrated to be in a safe(tripped) state, it is not necessary to see it cycled to/from the untripped state -if the element has in fact failed this will be revealed when a process start is attempted.
Once a final element operation has been proved, it is not necessary to prove its operation for each independent initiator. Sometimes initiator circuit contacts are wired in series in a final element supply circuit (rather than via a separately identifiable logic solver sub system), in which case, once the final element itself has been proven, it will normally be sufficient to prove that each contact in the supply circuit goes open circuit upon operation of the associated initiator. A break at the correct point in a final element failsafe supply circuit should be confirmed. A supply circuit might be de-energised for a number of reasons -confirmation of a deenergised final element state does not necessarily confirm operation of the protection function.
Where hazardous fluids are involved, any interference with the process connections (e.g., to perform in-situ calibration or to allow removal of a device to a workshop) is itself potentially hazardous to personnel, or may, for example, allow introduction of moisture which might ultimately compromise the measurement. There is also a residual risk of the connection not being correctly restored which is a potentially dangerous failure on some measurements e.g. high pressure trips.
Under such circumstances, it may be preferable to perform a simple (but formally recorded) observational check that the measurement is 'live and credible'. I.E., that the measurement is responding and not frozen for some reason, and that the value is consistent with plant conditions and other measurements.
Continuous process measurements (as distinct from switching devices) may have their calibrations checked by comparison with other measurements of the same plant variable. Far from being a less rigorous approach, this may help identify potential failure mechanisms, such as blocked impulse lines, which would not be apparent with a workshop calibration check. Consideration should be given to possible common mode errors however (particularly the possibility of calibration/ranging errors) and the reliance placed upon the protection provision (how high the SIL). If measurements are made using different technologies there would be a corresponding increase in confidence in the comparison. Checks may be retrospective via historic trend data.
A periodic (and formally recorded) check of indications when the plant is running may obviate the need for calibration checks when performing protection system proof tests with the plant shutdown.
Note that inaccuracies at other than the trip point do not impinge on the protection function and multi-point calibrations may be of questionable value. A second or third point check may be useful in highlighting any gross non-linearity that might indicate a failing device or ranging error, but a single point check sufficiently close to the trip point may be adequate. A full 5+ point calibration of every measurement is not likely to be warranted.
Testing in-situ is preferable wherever practicable. If an item is to be removed for overhaul purposes -testing should, of course, be conducted AFTER reinstatement. In-situ calibration checks are also preferred. Removal to a workshop should be confined to critical measurements that cannot be validated in-situ, or where removal is necessary for other reasons e.g. maintenance overhaul.
Following a calibration check of the sensor, signal injection may be used to test the input circuit to the logic solver. A direct mA injection may be preferable to the use of a hand held terminal with a 'smart' device, since the connection/disconnection of a mA injector would be a failsafe disturbance. It would seem perverse to deny use of the calibration mode of a smart device however; the critical requirement is to have positive affirmation of a return to on-line measurement mode. (Possibly by cycling power off/on to force a return to default on-line mode.)
It is preferable to use an injector that can be operated in measurand engineering units rather than signal levels (mA, V, %), since this avoids the potential error in conversion and would prompt investigation of any discrepancy. This is one immediate advantage of using a smart device in injection mode.
Trip amplifier settings should not be adjusted as a means of exercising a trip function -there is a danger that the correct setting may not be reinstated. The measurement signal should be exercised (usually by signal injection) to prove correct setting and operation.
Testing should not normally be by placing a real demand on the protection -i.e. by forcing the process to the trip point -failure of the protection may result in an incident. This approach may be www.instmc.org.uk Regular Paper: Who's Afraid of Proof Testing? acceptable if appropriate provisions are made in recognition of the possibility of a protection failure. This might be as simple as, for example, having someone standby ready to report an overfill on a vessel. The extent and rigour of the provisions should reflect the potential hazard consequences.
Specific Initiator Test Considerations

Pressure Transmitters
Suitable manifold and test connections may facilitate in-situ calibration check. In-situ pressure injection will normally allow full initiator testing without the need for separate injection of a mA signal. If practicable, it is preferable to test by pressure injection at the process end of any impulse line connection. If in-situ pressure injection is impracticable, mA injection may be substituted for the initiator circuit test, with a separate calibration check made on the pressure transmitter.
Temperature Measurements
RTDs are passive devices and a simple measurement check against other indications or a portable instrument may be all that is required. A full workshop calibration is not likely to be warranted for most applications. Injection of resistance in lieu of the RTD can then be used to check the initiator circuit operation. A similar approach may be adopted with thermocouples and mV injection. Correct sensor open circuit (burnout) response should be confirmed by disconnection of the amplifier input.
Flow Measurements
Unless there is some reason to expect a significant shift in primary device flow coefficient or k-factor (unusual in meters with no moving parts in the absence of potential for corrosion/abrasion/deposition) there is not likely to be a need to perform a wet calibration at every proof test. Primary signal injection ('Dry' calibration) to prove correct signal conditioning is likely to be sufficient. Visual inspection to confirm absence of physical degradation may be employed. Full wet calibration might be employed at extended intervals.
Level Switches
Tuning fork type devices usually have a good diagnostic provision and an electronic test function may be available. If suitably configured for safe failure, the requirement to remove the switch from the process and dip the sensor may be obviated or only undertaken at extended intervals perhaps.
Similar considerations may apply to capacitance type sensors. Simple application of a finger to the sensor terminals within the head may provide sufficient capacitance shift to prove the switching functionality.
Level Transmitters
These may be most simply checked by comparison with other measurements, sight glass readings or dips. On some vessels, a portable ultrasonic detector may be used externally to detect level.
Time of flight measurements may be removed for calibration against a distance reference, but this may be of questionable value given the intelligent diagnostic provisions of such devices, and the susceptibility of the reading to process conditions and vessel configuration and furniture.
Hydrostatic level measurements may be treated as pressure measurements.
Specific Logic Solver Considerations
These are by far the most reliable sub-system, and testing requirements are likely to be less onerous. Logic solving is a digital two-state operation and not susceptible to drift and the requirement for calibration checks. Providing good change management and access controls are in place there should be no reason to expect the functional design to be compromised. A full function check is likely to require the wholesale application of overrides and a significant fail-to-danger disturbance to the installation. This is unlikely to be warranted for many installations, or may perhaps be considered only at extended intervals.
[Some solid state systems allow function testing through pulse propagation. PLC coding could be copied and tested on an off line system.]
All initiator inputs should be cycled to prove their operation and correct addressing: check for presence/absence of signal/continuity at the logic solver input (if a PLC, in 'monitor' mode you may monitor the status of the relevant logic element). All outputs should be observed in the safe state. Cycling of outputs is usually impracticable because of the need to apply overrides to inhibit initiators, but if the safe output state is proved (typically open circuit or supply absence) there is little remaining prospect of a dangerous random failure and coverage factor will be correspondingly high. (With the initiators already proved, and the output demonstrated to be in a safe condition, it would need a failure within the LS that spuriously drives an output to a safe condition when input/output states change from those prevailing under test conditions -a very obscure possibility).
Specific Final Element Considerations
Control Valve -Non Tight Shut Off Control valve failures are revealed in normal operation. Even failure of the closure member or associated linkage would be revealed (unlike a normally passive on/off valve). The testing requirement is on the output circuit from the logic solver.
With process shutdown and the trip active, and with air supply confirmed as on, valve position may be confirmed as tripped. There remains a need to confirm solenoid valve operation if the valve may have moved to the trip position for other reasons e.g. control system command.
Options: a) Break in supply circuit confirmed. (Solenoid spool operation untested). b) With the control command to the valve set to maintain fail position (if necessary), energise the solenoid with a flying lead -check solenoid operation by sound/feel. (Vent path untested). c) With the solenoid circuit isolated (failsafe) confirm the valve will not operate when commanded -needs positive confirmation that operation command is active and effective -failure in the command would appear as successful solenoid operation. Note that if the test fails, the valve will move -beware of a possible hazard. Might be implemented by isolation of supply at start up, with de-isolation upon instruction from operations when the valve operation required. d) With the valve in the healthy position, isolate the solenoid supply and confirm the valve stroke.
On/Off Valve
If the valve is exercised as part of routine operations its failure would be revealed, and the provisions identified for a control valve would
